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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

A LESSON IN DRAFTING HOME
MORTGAGES AFTER NOBELMAN:
WHEN TAKING MORE RESULTS IN
LESS

In a period of declining real estate
values, it is not surprising to find
that the principal balance of a home
mortgage loan exceeds the cun:ent
value of the property. It is also not
surprising that home owners unable
to pay high monthly payments have
looked to Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code as a possible avenue to
reduce their mortgage obligations.
Turning to Chapter 13, instead of
Clrapter 7, has become more important for individual debtors since the
Supreme Court held in its 1992 decision in Dewsnup v. Timm 1 that a
Chapter 7 debtor may not avoid,
or "strip down," a lien to current
market value merely because the
value of the property was less than
the amount of the debt at the time
of bankruptcy. The Supreme Court
left open the question of whether
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its decision in Dewsnup has any
application in a Chapter 13 case. 2
Chapter 13 contains a special protection, found in no other chapter,
that is designed to protect the sanctity of the home mortgage. Section
1322(b)(2) of the Code provides that
a Chapter 13 plan may:
(2) modify the rights of holders of
secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest
in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence, or of holders of
unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class
of claims; [emphasis added] 3

Until recently, courts were not in
agreement on whether a Chapter 13
debtor could bifurcate an undersecured mortgage on the debtor's
principal residence into secured and
unsecured claims, and to modify or
2
The Supreme Court based its decision
in Dewsnup on the meaning of the words
"allowed secured claim" in Section 506(d)
of the Code. The Court, however, specifically stated in a footnote that "we express no
opinion as to whether the words 'allowed
secured claim' have different meaning in
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."
112 S. Ct. at 778 n.3. Therefore, the Supreme Court left unanswered the question of
whether Dewsnup governs the interpretation
of "allowed secured claim" in Section
1325(a)(5).
3
11 u.s.c. § 1322(b)(2).
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eliminate the unsecured claim only. 4
By doing so, the debtor would be
able to effectively reduce the mortgage to the value of the home, and,
through a Chapter 13 plan, continue
to pay monthly mortgage payments
untU the stripped-down secured
claim has been paid in full. That is,
the Chapter 13 plan would provide
for payment of the monthly installments under the loan agreement
without reducti9n, but that the payments would stop after the principal
paid equalletl the stripped-down lien
amount. Courts were divided on
whether this strategy violated the
Code's prohibition found in Section
1322(b)(2) with respect to the modification of the rights of the holder
of the home mortgage.
The Supreme Court finally resolved this issue in Nobelnum v.
American Savings Bank, 5 a case in
which the Chapter 13 debtor attempted to strip down the home
mortgagee's lien, which secured its
$71 ,335 claim, to the $23,500 value
of the collateral, and to treat the
$47,835 deficiency as an unsecured
claim to be paid nothing under the
plan. The Supreme Court held that
the bifurcation of a home mortgage
into secured and unsecured portions, and modification of the unse• See, e.g., In re Bellamy, 962 F .2d 176
(2d Cir. 1992) (Chapter 13 stripdown of
home mortgage to value of collateral was
permitted and did not violate Section
1322(b)(2)); In re Houghland, 886 F.2d
1187 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). Contra, In re
Nobelman, 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992);
In re Etchin, 128 BR 662 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1991).
s 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).

cured deficiency claim, ·is not permitted in a chapter 13 case.
[T]o give effect to § 506(a)'s valuation and bifurcation of secured claims
through a Chapter 13 plan in the
manner petitioners propose would
require a modification of the rights
of the holder of the security interest.
Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits such
modification where, as here, the
lender's claim is secured only by a
lien on the debtor's principal residence.6

Accordingly, claim bifurcation
and lien stripping in Chapter 13
cases with respect to a mortgage on
only the debtor's principal residence is not permitted under the
Code.
Chapter 13 Lien Stripping on
Property Other Than the Debtor's
Principal Residence
Although the Supreme Court in
Nobelnum made it clear that, because of Section 1322(b)(2), claim
bifurcation and lien stripping may
not be accomplished in Chapter 13
when the collateral is only the-debtor's principal residence, that decision did not address the application
of the Supreme Court's prohibition
of Chapter 7 lien stripping announced in Dewsnup to a Chapter
13 case in which the collateral is not
the debtor's principal residence.
In reHirsch
An interesting decision that came
from the Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
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after the Supreme Court's decisions
in Dewsnup and Nobelman is In
re Hirsch. 1 The opinion in Hirsch
demonstrates how at least some lower courts may narrowly construe the
Supreme Court's prohibitions on
lien stripping.
In 1989, the debtor and his wife
financed the purchase of their home
in Philadelphia with a $92,000 loan
from Citicorp. The debtor and his
wife executed a mortgage document
that gave Citicorp a mortgage on the
real prop~rty and "all easements,
rights, appurtenances, rents, royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and
profits, water rights and stock and
all fixtures now or hereafter a part
of the property.'' A judgment of
mortgage foreclosure was entered
in April 1992 in the sum of
$107,779, later reassessed to
$122,898.
In March 1993, the debtor filed
an individual Chapter 13 petition
at a time when, according to the
debtor, the value of the home was
only $85,000. He filed a plan that
contemplated $2,300 monthly payments for-sixty months which would
be sufficient to pay off the alleged
allowed secured claim of $85,000.
The debtor commenced adversary
proceedings to strip down the
amount of Citicorp's mortgage to
the $85,000 value of the home, and
to avoid entirely the lien of an alleged second mortgagee. The proceeding against the second mortgagee was settled, and Citicorp and
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the debtor submitted a stipulation
agreeing that the value of the home
was $88,000.
In its decision, the Bankruptcy
Court permitted the strip down of
Citicorp's mortgage despite the Supreme Court's holding in Nobelman. The Bankruptcy Court begain
by holding that the prohibition on
lien stripping found in Dewsnup
does not apply in any cases other
than Chapter 7 cases:
[l]t is important to emphasize what
Nobelman did not decide. Firstly, the
Court did not rely on the reasoning
employed in the context of a Chapter
7 case in Dewsnup v. Timm [citation
omitted]. It did not hold that a 'strip
down' of a mortgagee's lien was not
permissible in a Chapter 13 case ...
[T]he Court did not hold that the
reasoning of Dewsnup applied to a
Chapter 13 (or a Chapter 11) case. If
the Court had so reasoned, it would
have been unnecessary for it to reach
the issue of the impact of
§ 1322(b)(2) upon 'lien stripping.'
However, Dewsnup is not even cited
in the brief Nobelman opinion. 8

The most surprising aspect of the
decision in Hirsch was the court's
scrutiny of the mortgage documents
to fmd that "it was not a security
interest in only the debtor's residence.

7 1993 WL 225742 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
June 25, 1993).
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[T]he Court [in Nobelman] did not
comment on the issue of whether 11
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) was applicable
to the mortgage- at issue, given the
particular security interests taken
therein, because the Nobelman debt8

1993 WL225742, at *2.
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or apparentlY. assumed or ~needed
$it the mortgage in issue Was within
the scope of§ 1322(b)(2).9

downs in Chapter 13 cases when the
scope of the mortgage goes beyond
the real estate. 11

The Bankruptcy Court then examined the language of Section
1322(b)(2) ("other than a claim secured only by a security interest in
real property that is 1:\1~ debtor's
principal residence") and.held that
the mortgage executed by the debtor
and his wife did not fit within that
narrow category.

Conclusion
Needless to say, mortgagees will
have to be careful in the drafting of
mortgage documents if ·they want
the protection afforded by the Supreme Court's decision in Nobelman. Lien stripping may still be
available to the Chapter 13 debtor if
the mortgage includes any personal
property or other assets that is not
the debtor's principal residence.
Clearly, the overzealous mortgagee
who attempts to obtain as much collateral as possible may fmd-in a
subsequent. Chapter 13 case in
which the debtor seeks'to strip down
the mortgage to the current collateral value-that by taking more, it
received less.

There is ample authority for the principle that 'the parties' instant mortgage, in which a security interest
in "rents," "profits," present and
future '"fixtures," and all "replacements and additions'' to the Home
is taken, is not a claim secured
"only by . . . real property," and
hence is not within the scope of
§ 1322(b)(2). 10

Based on this reasoning, the court
held that the debtor may bifurcate
Citicorp's claim and strip down
Citicorp' s lien to the value of the
home. Other courts also have used
this same reasoning to permit strip
9Jd.
10 ld.

11
See, e.g., In re Hammond, 62 USLW
2035, 1993 WL 25878g (E.D. Pa. July 2,
1993) (Nobelrrum ,and section 1322(b)(2)
were inapplicable where the home mortgage
provided that it also covered "any and all
applicances, machinery, furniture and
equipment (whether fixtures or not) of any
nature whatsoever now or hereafter installed
in or upon said premises."). See also, Wilson v: Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895
F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
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